Toward Adversarial Robustness via Semi-supervised Robust Training by Li, Yiming et al.
Toward Adversarial Robustness via Semi-supervised
Robust Training
Yiming Li1, Baoyuan Wu2, Yan Feng1 Yanbo Fan2, Yong Jiang1, Zhifeng Li2, Shutao Xia1
1Tsinghua Shenzhen International Graduate School, Tsinghua University, China
2Tencent AI Lab, China
wubaoyuan1987@gmail.com; xiast@sz.tsinghua.edu.cn
Abstract
Adversarial examples have been shown to be the severe threat to deep neural
networks (DNNs). One of the most effective adversarial defense methods is
adversarial training (AT) through minimizing the adversarial risk Radv, which
encourages both the benign example x and its adversarially perturbed neighbor-
hoods within the `p-ball to be predicted as the ground-truth label. In this work,
we propose a novel defense method, the robust training (RT), by jointly min-
imizing two separated risks (Rstand and Rrob), which are with respect to the
benign example and its neighborhoods, respectively. The motivation is to explic-
itly and jointly enhance the accuracy and the adversarial robustness. We prove
that Radv is upper-bounded by Rstand + Rrob, which implies that RT has sim-
ilar effect as AT. Intuitively, minimizing the standard risk enforces the benign
example to be correctly predicted, and the robust risk minimization encourages
the predictions of the neighbor examples to be consistent with the prediction of
the benign example. Besides, since Rrob is independent of the ground-truth la-
bel, RT is naturally extended to the semi-supervised mode (i.e., SRT), to further
enhance the adversarial robustness. Moreover, we extend the `p-bounded neigh-
borhood to a general case, which covers different types of perturbations, such as
the pixel-wise (i.e., x+ δ) or the spatial perturbation (i.e., Ax+ b). Extensive
experiments on benchmark datasets not only verify the superiority of the proposed
SRT method to state-of-the-art methods for defensing pixel-wise or spatial per-
turbations separately, but also demonstrate its robustness to both perturbations
simultaneously. The code for reproducing main results is available at https:
//github.com/THUYimingLi/Semi-supervised_Robust_Training.
1 Introduction
It has been shown that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial examples [1, 2, 3].
Considering the wide application of DNNs in many mission-critical tasks (e.g., face recognition), it
is urgent to develop effective defense methods for adversarial examples. One of the most promising
defense methods is adversarial training (AT) [4, 5], which minimizes the adversarial risk Radv. It
firstly defines the perturbed neighborhood set bounded by `p-norm around each benign example
x, and the perturbation is generated by some off-the-shelf adversarial attack methods, such as
PGD [5] or FGSM [4]. Radv indicates the maximal loss value among the neighborhood samples
and the benign example. It couples the classification risks on both the benign example x and its
surrounding `p-bounded perturbed neighborhood examples. Minimizing Radv encourages both x
and its neighborhoods to be correctly predicted.
In this work, we propose to separate the classification risk on x and its perturbed neighborhoods,
respectively. We propose a novel robust training (RT) method by minimizing Rstand + λRrob. In RT,
Rstand indicates whether benign example x is correctly predicted, while the robust riskRrob indicates
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the maximal value of the 0/1-loss that measures whether x and one of its perturbed neighborhoods
are predicted as the same class, among all neighborhoods of x. We prove that Radv is upper-bounded
by Rstand +Rrob, which guarantees that RT has the similar effect as AT. Specifically, minimizing
Rrob encourages the predictions of the neighborhood examples to be consistent with the prediction
of x. Compared to AT, RT has two additional benefits. First, the balance between the classification
accuracy on benign examples and the robustness to adversarial examples can be explicitly controlled
by adjusting a trade-off hyper-parameter, i.e., λ. Second, one important property of Rrob is that
the ground-truth label of x is not involved, while only the prediction of x is adopted. It means
that Rrob doesn’t require labeled training examples. Therefore, RT can be naturally extended to the
semi-supervised mode, dubbed semi-supervised robust training (SRT), by incorporating massive
unlabeled examples into Rrob. Experiments verify that the usage of the unlabeled examples in SRT
could significantly enhance both the accuracy and the robustness to adversarial examples.
Moreover, we notice that most existing works on adversarial training adopt the `p-bounded neighbor-
hood when generating adversarial examples during the training. This neighborhood corresponds to
the pixel-wise adversarial perturbations, i.e., x+ δ. Meanwhile, many researches have found that
there are also many other types of adversarial perturbations, such as the spatial perturbation or the
functional perturbation. It has been observed [6] that the defense designed for pixel-wise perturba-
tions doesn’t work for other types of perturbations. Is it possible to train a robust model to defend
different types of adversarial perturbations simultaneously? To explore this problem, we extend the
`p-bounded neighborhood definition to a general case, since the perturbation type is closely related to
the perturbed neighborhood. This new definition allows a general transformation-based perturbation
and measures the distance between x and its perturbations using different metrics. This extension
could be naturally embedded into SRT, as it only updates the form of neighborhood set. Consequently,
the model trained using SRT with general perturbed neighborhood could simultaneously defend
different types of perturbations.
The main contributions of this work are three-fold. 1) We propose a robust training method by jointly
minimizing the standard risk and the robust risk, which is naturally extended the semi-supervised
mode. 2) By generalizing the definition of the perturbed neighborhood to cover different types of
perturbations, our robust training achieves the joint robustness to different perturbations, such as
the pixel-wise and spatial perturbation. 3) Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets verify the
superiority of the proposed SRT method to state-of-the-art adversarial training methods, as well as
the robustness of SRT to pixel-wise and spatial perturbations simultaneously.
2 Related Work
Supervised Adversarial Defense. DNNs are known to be vulnerable to different types of well-
designed small adversarial perturbation, such as pixel-wise perturbation [1, 7, 8] and spatial perturba-
tion [9, 6, 10]. Those attacks usually based on the relation between the prediction and the ground-truth
label of the sample, i.e.they are in a supervised manner. Toward the adversarial robustness against
those attacks, several supervised adversarial defense methods were proposed. These methods can be
roughly divided into three main categories, including adversarial training based defense [4, 5, 11],
detection based defense [12, 13, 14], and reconstruction-based defense [15, 16, 17]. Adversarial
training based defense is currently the most mainstream research direction, which improves the
adversarial robustness via adding various adversarially manipulated samples during the training
process. For example, standard adversarial training improved the model robustness through training
on adversarial examples generated by FGSM [4] and PGD [5], and the trade-off inspired adversarial
defense (TRADES) generated manipulated samples by further considering the trade-off between
robustness and accuracy [11]. Recently, inspired by the geometric property of loss surface, other
regularization-based defenses were also proposed [18, 19, 20]. Although many defenses have been
proposed, there is still a long way to go for solving the adversarial vulnerability problem.
Recently, some attempts have been proposed to defend multiple perturbations together. In [6], they
observed that pixel-wise defense techniques have limited benefit to the spatial robustness. This
problem is further investigated in [21], where the author proved that there exists a trade-off in
robustness to different types of attacks in a natural and simple statistical setting. In other words, it is
likely that there is no defense that could reach best robustness under every attacks. How to defend
against different types of attacks simultaneously is still an important open question.
Semi-supervised Learning and its Usage in Defense. The semi-supervised learning focuses on
how to utilize a large amount of unlabeled data to learn better models [22, 23, 24]. Some recent works
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proposed to extend the supervised adversarial training to the semi-supervised setting. For example,
the virtual adversarial loss [25] is defined as the robustness of the conditional label distribution
around each benign example against local perturbation, which firstly connected the semi-supervised
learning with the adversarial training. Besides, some works uncovered the role of unlabeled data in
the adversarial defense theoretically [26, 27]. It is proved [27] that the sample complexity for learning
a pixel-wise adversarially robust model from unlabeled data matches the fully supervised case up to
constant factors, under simplified statistical settings. Similarly, [26] proved that the gap of sample
complexity between standard and robust classification can be filled by using additional unlabeled
data in the Gaussian model. However, although they all provided some theoretical insights for the
importance of unlabeled data in adversarial defense, the intrinsic reason is still not well answered.
3 Proposed Method
3.1 Preliminaries
We denote the classifier as fw : X → [0, 1]|Y|, with X ⊂ Rd being the instance space and
Y = {1, 2, · · · ,K} being the label space. f(x) indicates the posterior vector with respect to K
classes, and C(x) = argmax fw(x) denotes the predicted label. The labeled dataset is denoted
as DL = {(xi, yi)|i = 1, . . . , Nl}, where (xi, yi) is independent and identically sampled from an
unknown latent distribution PX×Y . Let D′L = {x|(x, y) ∈ DL} indicates the instance set of DL,DU = {xi|i = 1, . . . , Nu} denotes the unlabeled dataset.
Definition 1. The -bounded transformation-based neighborhood set of the benign example x is
defined as follows:
N,T (x) = {T (x; θ)| dist (T (x; θ),x) ≤ } , (1)
where T (·; θ) indicates a parametric transformation, and dist(·, ·) is a given distance metric cor-
responding to T (·; θ). Non-negative hyper-parameter  denotes the maximum perturbation size.
Remark. N,T can reduce to some widely used neighborhood sets through different specifications of
T (·; θ) and dist(·, ·). For example, if we set T (x; θ) = x+ θ and dist (T (x; θ),x) = ‖T (x; θ)−
x‖∞, thenN,T becomes the `∞-bounded neighborhood set used in the pixel-wise adversarial attack
and defense [28, 5, 11]. If we set T (x; θ) = [cos θ,− sin θ; sin θ, cos θ]x and dist (T (x; θ),x) = θ,
then N,T indicates the rotation-based neighborhood set used in the spatial adversarial attack and
defense [6, 10]. This flexibility is important for developing a method to defend multiple types of
adversarial perturbations, which will be shown later.
Based on the general transformation-based neighborhood defined above, we can extend the traditional
adversarial risk and the robust risk to the form as follows:
Definition 2 (Standard, Adversarial, and Robust Risk).
• The standard risk Rstand measures whether the prediction of x (i.e., C(x)), is same with
its ground-truth label y. Its definition with respect to a labeled dataset D is formulated as
Rstand(D) = E(x,y)∼PD [I{C(x) 6= y}] , (2)
where PD indicates the distribution behind D. I(a) denotes the indicator function: I(a) = 1
if a is true, otherwise I(a) = 0. [11]
• The N,T -based adversarial risk with respect to D is defined as
Radv(D) = E(x,y)∼PD [ max
x′∈N,T (x)
I{C(x′) 6= y}]. (3)
• The N,T -based robust risk with respect to D is defined as
Rrob(D) = Ex∼PD′ [ max
x′∈N,T (x)
I{C(x′) 6= C(x)}]. (4)
Remark. Radv considers the classification accuracy on both the benign example x and its adversarial
perturbations withinN,T (x). Rstand is only related to the classification accuracy on x. Rrob doesn’t
involve the ground-truth label y, and it only corresponds to the consistency between the prediction of
x and its adversarial perturbations, i.e., robustness. Their relations are shown in Lemma 1. Due to
the space limit, the proof of Lemma 1 will be presented in the Appendix (Section 1).
Lemma 1. Standard Risk, adversarial risk and robust risk of a sample x are correlated. Specifically,
Radv(x) = Rstand(x) + (1−Rstand(x))Rrob(x). (5)
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3.2 Robust Training
Based on the Definition 2, we propose a novel robust training (RT)1 method, as follows
min
w
Rstand(DL) + λ ·Rrob(DL), (6)
where λ > 0 is a trade-off parameter. The relationship between RT and the standard adversarial
training (AT) [5] is analyzed in Theorem 1 (whose proof is in the Appendix (Section 1)). RT is
minimizing the upper bound of Radv, if we set λ = 1. It tells that RT could have the similar effect
with AT. However, due to the separation of the classification accuracy and the robustness in RT, there
are two important advantages compared to AT. 1) λ can explicitly control the trade-off between the
accuracy to benign examples and the robustness to adversarial examples, which will be verified in
later experiments. λ can be adjusted according to the user’s demand. 2) What is more important,
since Radv doesn’t utilize the ground-truth labels, it can be defined with respect to any unlabeled
example. Thus, it is natural to extend RT to the semi-supervised mode, as shown in Section 3.3.
Theorem 1. The relationship between the adversarial training and the robust training is as follows
min
w
Radv(D) ≤ min
w
{Rstand(D) +Rrob(D)}. (7)
3.3 Semi-supervised Robust Training
As stated above, Rrob could be defined with respect to any unlabeled data. Thus, we propose the
semi-supervised robust training (SRT), as follows
min
w
Rstand(DL) + λ ·Rrob(DL ∪ DU ). (8)
Note that RT (i.e., Eq. (6)) is a special case of Eq. (8), in the case that DU = ∅.
Due to the non-differentiability of the indicator function I(·) used in Rstand and Rrob, we resort to
its approximated loss function, such as the cross-entropy. Besides, we replace the expectation with
respect to PD in Eq. (8) by the sample mean with respect to D. Then, the approximated objective
function is formulated as follows:
min
w
1
|DL|
∑
(x,y)∈DL
L(fw(x), y)+ λ|D′L ∪ DU |
∑
x∈D′L∪DU
max
x′∈N,T (x)
L(fw(x′), C(x)), (9)
where L(·) indicates the cross-entropy function.
Similar to the optimization for adversarial training, the minimax problem (9) can be solved by
alternatively solving the inner-maximization and the outer-minimization sub-problem, as follows:
• Inner-maximization: given w, ∀x ∈ D′L ∪ DU , we derive an perturbed example x′ by
x′ ← argmax
x′∈N,T (x)
L(fw(x′), C(x)). (10)
• Outer-minimization: given all generated x′, the parameter w is updated as follows:
w ← argmin
w
1
|DL|
∑
(x,y)∈DL
L(fw(x), y)+ λ|D′L ∪ DU |
∑
x∈D′L∪DU
L(fw(x′), C(x)). (11)
According to the specified N,T (x), the inner-maximization could be solved by different adversarial
attacks, such as PGD in pixel-wise scenario [5] or Worst-of-k in spatial scenario [6]. For outer-
minimization, there is no close-form solution to this problem. Instead, we update w using back-
propagation [33] with the stochastic gradient descent [34].
Besides, adversarial training (e.g., AT [5], TRADES [11] and SRT) are often much more time-
consuming than the standard training. To alleviate this problem, we further propose an accelerated
version of SRT (dubbed fast SRT), which is described and evaluated in the Appendix (Section 9).
1We notice that the name “robust training" has been used in some other works, such as in [29, 30, 31, 32],
etc. However, their objective functions are totally different with ours. For example, the "robust training" in [32]
indicates a robust hinge loss in the object function. Here we re-define "robust training" based on the robust risk.
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Table 1: Performance of SRT and RT under dif-
ferent spatial settings on CIFAR-10 dataset.
Clean RandAdv GridAdv
Standard 80.63 8.82 0.09
RT (λ = 0.15) 85.24 64.45 41.23
SRT (λ = 0.15) 88.04 78.03 62.97
RT (λ = 0.20) 85.71 66.43 44.28
SRT (λ = 0.20) 88.87 78.99 64.83
RT (λ = 0.25) 85.59 67.95 45.93
SRT (λ = 0.25) 88.40 78.39 64.15
RT (λ = 0.30) 84.99 67.47 45.72
SRT (λ = 0.30) 87.99 78.12 62.73
Table 2: Performance of SRT and RT under dif-
ferent pixel-wise settings on CIFAR-10 dataset.
Clean FGSM PGD
Standard 87.69 6.65 0
RT (λ = 0.2) 83.24 48.94 31.91
SRT (λ = 0.2) 83.83 51.39 34.94
RT (λ = 0.4) 81.05 51.15 36.01
SRT (λ = 0.4) 82.28 56.06 41.84
RT (λ = 0.6) 79.93 51.56 37.73
SRT (λ = 0.6) 81.03 56.83 44.60
RT (λ = 0.8) 78.37 51.97 37.91
SRT (λ = 0.8) 80.23 58.14 47.24
4 Experiments
Unless otherwise specified, the training set is divided into two parts, one of which contains 10,000
samples serves as the labeled dataset, and the remaining part is used as the unlabeled dataset in
all experiments. In addition, in the semi-supervised setting, we use batch sizes proportional to the
dataset size, i.e.for a total batch size m, the number of labeled samples and unlabeled samples within
a batch is m · |DL||DL|+|DU | and m ·
|DU |
|DL|+|DU | , respectively. Similar with most previous works of
adversarial training, we also conduct experiments on CIFAR-10 [35] and MNIST [36] dataset. Note
that other large scale dataset like the popular ImageNet [37] has been rarely adopted in adversarial
training, due to the unbearable high computational cost. As reported in [38], training a ResNet-101
[39] model using the AT method [5] on ImageNet takes about 4,864 GPU hours. Since almost all
state-of-the-art methods compared in this work didn’t evaluate on ImageNet, the cost of making a
thorough comparison on ImageNet is far beyond our budget.
4.1 Comparison between RT and SRT
Settings. We compare the performance of RT and SRT on the CIFAR-10 dataset. In the pixel-wise
adversarial scenario, we use the wide residual network WRN-34-10 [40], and set the perturbation
size 1 = 0.031. To evaluate the robustness, we apply PGD-20 with step size 0.003 and FGSM under
perturbation size 0.031, as suggested in [11]. In the spatial adversarial scenario, we use ResNet [39]
with 4 residual groups with filter size [16, 16, 32, 64] and 5 residual units each. We perform RandAdv
and GridAdv attack [6] to evaluate the spatial adversarial robustness. The spatial perturbation (i.e.,
rotation and translation) of RandAdv and GridAdv are determined through random sampling and grid
search, respectively. The maximum rotational perturbation is set as 30◦, and we consider translations
of at most 3 pixels. More detailed settings (e.g., learning schedule), and additional results on the
MNIST dataset will be presented in the Appendix (Section 2-3).
Results. As shown in Table 1-2, SRT is superior to RT under the same conditions, no matter in spatial
scenario or pixel-wise scenario. In particular, SRT is much more robust than RT under stronger attack
(PGD and GridAdv). For example, the adversarial accuracy of SRT is over more than 5% compared
to RT under PGD attack in most cases. This improvement is even more significant under GridAdv,
which is at least 17% (more than 20% in most cases). In addition, the clean accuracy of SRT is also
higher than that of RT in all cases. As such, we will only use SRT in the following comparisons.
In particular, an interesting phenomenon is that the clean accuracy does not decrease as the hyper-
parameter λ increases in the spatial adversarial settings. In other words, there is no trade-off between
the spatial adversarial robustness and the standard prediction performance. In contrast, the inherent
trade-off between clean accuracy and adversarial accuracy was verified theoretically and empirically
in the pixel-wise adversarial settings [41]. This interesting contradiction was discussed in [10], which
is out the scope of this paper.
4.2 Spatial Adversarial Defense
Settings. We select Worst-of-k [6] and KL divergence based regularization (KLR) [10] as the baseline
methods in the following evaluations. Those methods achieve the state-of-the-art results in the realm
of spatial adversarial defense. Besides, we also provide the standard training model (Standard) and
the pixel-wise adversarial training (AT) [5] as other important baselines for reference. The settings of
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Table 3: Adversarial accuracy (%) of different models under spatial attacks on CIFAR-10 and
MNIST dataset. The perturbation is determined through random sampling (RandAdv) or grid search
(GridAdv) with rotations and translations considered both together and separately (“RandAdv.R” and
“GridAdv.R” for rotations, and “RandAdv.T” and “GridAdv.T” for transformations).
Defense Clean RandAdv GridAdv RandAdv.T GridAdv.T RandAdv.R GridAdv.R
CIFAR-10
Standard 80.63 8.82 0.09 33.61 19.67 19.55 10.73
AT 65.59 4.92 0.22 16.23 7.49 14.47 8.37
Worst-of-k 82.02 70.92 54.80 75.49 69.45 73.18 68.22
KLR 85.40 72.77 56.28 77.43 72.71 74.80 71.04
SRT 88.87 78.99 64.83 82.16 78.47 80.84 77.24
MNIST
Standard 97.19 14.01 0.00 35.31 5.12 65.06 51.32
AT 97.96 29.84 0.01 51.83 10.72 71.66 57.71
Worst-of-k 98.05 94.77 84.64 96.07 93.99 95.70 94.24
KLR 98.43 95.26 86.08 96.63 95.07 95.92 94.48
SRT 98.64 97.02 92.12 97.68 96.85 97.33 96.54
Table 4: Adversarial accuracy (%) of different models under pixel-wise attacks.
Defense Clean FGSM PGD MI-FGSM JSMA C&W Point-wise Attack DDNA
CIFAR-10
Standard 88.43 7.26 0 0 9.98 0.14 2.06 0.01
AT 77.17 50.35 37.37 36.97 10.80 33.42 14.27 20.87
TRADES 76.23 51.98 40.20 39.79 11.90 36.09 12.32 22.37
UAT 78.45 56.35 44.96 44.56 13.23 40.03 12.62 24.08
RST 79.99 59.55 48.38 47.97 13.78 42.99 13.42 27.73
SRT 78.46 59.34 48.66 48.24 16.99 43.33 18.80 27.71
MNIST
Standard 99.01 41.06 2.87 4.37 10.18 0.01 0.04 16.44
AT 98.99 96.61 94.69 93.57 20.99 94.67 2.47 95.35
TRADES 98.99 96.92 95.12 93.98 18.48 92.37 2.08 94.12
UAT 99.16 97.51 96.14 95.65 23.79 96.16 5.52 96.39
RST 98.83 97.21 95.47 95.05 26.63 95.34 3.30 94.25
SRT 99.28 97.77 96.60 95.79 26.79 96.19 5.81 96.10
hyper-parameters of baseline methods follow the suggestions in their original manuscripts. For the
proposed SRT method, we set λ = 0.2 on both CIFAR-10 and MNIST. Other detailed settings, e.g.,
learning rate and iterations, will be presented in the Appendix (Section 4).
Results. As shown in Table 3, SRT significantly exceeds all existing methods. For example, SRT
achieves more than 5% improvement under any attacks on the CIFAR-10 dataset, compared with the
current state-of-the-art method, the KLR. In addition, similar to the phenomenon in Section 4.1, the
clean accuracy of SRT is also higher compared to all existing methods. This improvement of clean
accuracy is presumably because the spatial adversarial defense serve as an effective data augmentation
approach. Note that the pixel-wise adversarial defense (i.e., AT) has almost no benefit to the spatial
adversarial robustness. In other words, pixel-wise adversarial robustness does not necessarily mean
general adversarial robustness. Therefore, developing a general adversarial framework toward general
adversarial robustness is of great significance.
4.3 Pixel-wise Adversarial Defense
Settings. We compare SRT with PGD-based AT [5], trade-off inspired adversarial defense (TRADES)
[11], unsupervised adversarial training (UAT) [41] and robust self-training (RST) [26]. TRADES is
the state-of-the-art supervised defense, while UAT and RST are the most advanced semi-supervised
adversarial defenses. In SRT, we set λ = 1 on both CIFAR-10 and MNIST dataset. To evaluate the
robustness, we apply FGSM [4], PGD [42], momentum iterative attack (MI-FGSM) [43] under `∞
norm. We also apply some other attack methods, including jacobian saliency map attack (JSMA)
[28], Carlini & Wagner attack (C&W) [44], point-wise attack [45], and decoupled direction and norm
attack (DDNA) [46] for the evaluation. Other settings are shown in the Appendix (Section 5).
Results. As shown in Table 4, compared to the supervised adversarial defense methods, semi-
supervised defenses (i.e., UAT, RST, and SRT) achieve significant improvement in both clean
accuracy and adversarial robustness with additional unlabeled samples. Among three different semi-
supervised defenses, SRT reaches the best performance. Specifically, on the CIFAR-10 and MNIST
datasets, SRT has the best adversarial robustness in most cases. In the case where a few are not the
best, SRT is still the sub-optimal. In addition, although UAT and RST perform similarly to and even
exceed SRT in a few cases, their superiority is not consistent across different datasets. For example,
RST has better performance on CIFAR-10, whereas UAT is better on MNIST.
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Figure 1: Compound adversarial attacks and defenses. First row: results on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
Second row: results on the MNIST dataset. The maximum perturbation size is the same as the one
used in previous experiments. Perturbation fraction represents the ratio of the current perturbation
size to the previous maximum perturbation size.
4.4 Compound Adversarial Attack and Defense
Settings. Here we evaluate the adversarial robustness to the attack consisting of multiple types of
adversarial attacks, dubbed compound attack2. We adopt two types of compound attacks, including
(1) combining the spatial attack GridAdv [6] on the top of the pixel-wise attack PGD [42] (dubbed
PGD+), and (2) combining PGD on the top of GridAdv (dubbed GridAdv+). Accordingly, we also
provide two compound defenses, including (1) combining the spatial defense Worst-of-k [6] on the
top of the pixel-wise defense AT [5] (AT+), and (2) combining the spatial SRT on the top of the
pixel-wise SRT (SRT+). Other detailed settings will be presented in the Appendix (Section 6).
Results. As shown in Figure 1, compared to the single type of attack, compound adversarial attacks
(GridAdv+ and PGD+) have a much stronger threat under the same conditions. This phenomenon
indicates that by simply combining different types of attacks, a powerful attack can be constructed,
which poses a huge threat to DNNs. In particular, the spatial adversarial defenses have limited benefit
to the pixel-wise defense, which can be observed by the subgraphs in third column. Especially on
the CIFAR-10 dataset, the adversarial accuracy could quickly drop to zero under PGD attack with
small perturbation fraction. This again confirms that a single type of defense may not have much
effect on defending against another type of attack. Besides, the results also suggest that the model
trained with the general perturbed neighborhood (i.e., AT+ and SRT+) could simultaneously defend
different types of perturbations, i.e., the compound attack. Compared to single-type defense methods,
compound defenses achieve significant improvements defending against compound attacks, as well
good defending performance to single attacks. In addition, in the case of compound defense, our
method (SRT+) is also better than the extension of previous methods (AT+).
4.5 The Effect of Unlabeled Data
In this section, we use PGD and GridAdv to evaluate the adversarial robustness under pixel-wise and
spatial scenario respectively. Except for the number of unlabeled samples, all settings are the same as
those used in Section 4.2-4.3.
(a) CIFAR-10 (b) MNIST
Figure 2: Adversarial accuracy w.r.t the number of unlabeled data.
2We notice that the name “compound attack” was also used in the area of network security, indicating the
combined attack of multiple cyber attacks. [47]
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(a) Spatial adversarial scenario (b) Pixel-wise adversarial scenario
Figure 3: Comparison between the decision surfaces of the SRT and those of the standard training
model on the MNIST dataset. First row: the 3D decision surface and their corresponding 2D version
of the standard training model. Second row: the decision surface of the model trained with SRT. In
the 3D decision surfaces, the X and Y axis represent two different perturbation directions and its
value indicates the perturbation size, while the Z-axis indicates the decision value. If and only if
the decision value is positive, the prediction is correct. In those figures, the red area indicates the
correctly classified region, while the blue area is the misclassified region.
As shown in Figure 2, the adversarial accuracy of models trained with SRT increases with the number
of unlabeled samples in all settings. Moreover, leveraging large amounts of unlabeled examples,
SRT achieves similar adversarial robustness to the supervised adversarial defense methods (AT
and Worst-of-k) trained with all labeled samples in the original training set (i.e., 60,000 samples
on MNIST, and 50,000 samples on CIFAR-10). In particular, in the setting of spatial attacks on
MNIST, the adversarial accuracy of SRT-based model trained with 10,000 labeled samples and
50,000 unlabeled samples even exceeds that of Worst-of-k with 60,000 labeled samples. Besides, the
adversarial accuracy still has an upward trend at the end of the curve (i.e., using all unlabeled data),
which implies that the robustness can be further improved if additional samples are utilized.
4.6 Decision Surface
In this section, we verify the effectiveness of SRT through visualizing of the geometry of the decision
surface on MNIST dataset. The decision valueD of a sample x is defined asD(x) = py−maxi 6=y pi,
where fw(x) = [p1; · · · ; pK ], D(x) > 0 indicates that the prediction of x is correct and vice versa.
We visualize the decision surface instead of the loss surface, since it can be further used to evaluate
the prediction performance. The decision surface on CIFAR-10, and the visualization of loss surfaces
is shown in the Appendix (Section 7).
As shown in Figure 3, the geometric property of decision surfaces of SRT-based model and that of
the standard training model are significantly different. Compared to SRT, the decision surfaces of the
standard training model have sharper peaks and larger slopes, which explains that the prediction of
this model is vulnerable to small perturbation. In contrast, the surfaces of SRT are relatively flat and
located on a plateau with positive decision confidence around the benign sample, though the decision
surface in the spatial scenario is more rugged than that in the pixel-wise scenario. Consequently, the
output of SRT still lies in the region of correct classification if perturbed with a certain range, which
explains the adversarial robustness of SRT.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel defense method, dubbed robust training (RT), by jointly minimizing
the standard risk and robust risk. We prove that Radv is upper-bounded by Rstand + Rrob, which
implies that RT has the similar effect as adversarial training. In addition, we extend RT to the
semi-supervised mode (i.e., SRT) to further enhance the adversarial robustness, due to the fact
that the robust risk is independent of the ground-truth label. Moreover, we extend the `p-bounded
neighborhood to a general case, which covers different types of perturbations. Consequently, the
model trained using SRT with general perturbed neighborhood could simultaneously defend different
types of perturbations. Extensive experiments verify the superiority of SRT for defensing pixel-wise
or spatial perturbations separately, as well as both perturbations simultaneously. Note that our
extension of the perturbed neighborhood is general and not limited to the pixel-wise and spatial
scenario. More types of transformations, such as blurring and color shifting, could be also covered. It
will be explored in our future work.
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6 Broader Impact
Adversarial defenses focus on the security issues of machine learning (ML), which is the cornerstone
before ML algorithms can be safely adopted. As such, as one of the adversarial defense, our work
has positive impacts in general.
Specifically, from the aspect of positive broader impacts, (1) our work can be adopted in the classifi-
cation systems to alleviate the risk of being successfully attacked; (2) our work theoretically analyzed
the relationship among standard risk, robust risk, and adversarial risk, which builds a bridge between
the robust optimization community and the adversarial learning community. As such, it may probably
promote further cooperations in these two areas; (3) we also verified the potential of unlabeled data
in the adversarial defense and proposed a method to do so, which may inspire deeper considerations
about how to generalize our approach in other applications (e.g., video classification); (4) we also
demonstrate the serious threat of compound adversarial attack and propose a method to alleviate it,
which may inspire more comprehensive research on this area; (5) Since the adversarial vulnerability
comes from the difference between human visual system and algorithms, our work may provide a
new angle toward understanding such difference.
From the aspect of negative broader impacts, (1) attackers may adopt the proposed compound
approach to create more malicious attacks; (2) the proposed method further promotes the requirement
of (unlabeled) data, which may further enhance the concerns about the data privacy.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Lemma 1. Standard Risk, adversarial risk and robust risk of a sample x are correlated. Specifically,
Radv(x) = Rstand(x) + (1−Rstand(x))Rrob(x). (12)
Proof. According to the definition of Radv (see Definition 2 in the main manuscript), we have
Radv(x) = max
x′∈Nδ,T (x)
I{C(x′) 6= y}. (13)
Since max
x′∈Nδ,T (x)
I{C(x′) 6= y} ∈ {0, 1}, and its value is 1 iff ∃x′ ∈ Nδ,T (x) s.t. C(x′) 6= y.
Therefore, we have
(13) = I {∃x′ ∈ Nδ,T (x) s.t. C(x′) 6= y} . (14)
EventA: ∃x′ ∈ Nδ,T (x) s.t. C(x′) 6= y can be divided into two disjoint sub-events, as follows:
A1 : (∃x′ ∈ Nδ,T (x) s.t. C(x′) 6= y) ∩ (C(x) 6= y),
A2 : (∃x′ ∈ Nδ,T (x) s.t. C(x′) 6= y) ∩ (C(x) = y).
LetB : ∃x′ ∈ Nδ,T (x) s.t. C(x′) 6= y, C : C(x) = y, now we prove thatA1 is true if and only if
event C : C(x) 6= y is true.
1) Suppose C is true, since x ∈ Nδ,T (x), we have
∃x′ ∈ Nδ,T (x) s.t. C(x′) 6= y
holds, i.e.,B is true, thereforeA1 = B ∩C is true.
2) Suppose C is false, thenA1 = B ∩C is false.
3) SupposeA1 = B ∩C is true, then C is true.
4) SupposeA1 = B ∩C is false, we can prove that C is false by seeking the contradiction.
Thus, we have
I{A1} = I{C(x) 6= y}. (15)
SinceA2 = B ∩C = (B ∩C) ∩C and
(B ∩C) : ∃x′ ∈ Nδ,T (x) s.t. C(x′) 6= C(x),
I{A2} = I{C} × I{B ∩C}
= I{C(x) = y} × I {∃x′ ∈ Nδ,T (x) s.t. C(x′) 6= C(x)} . (16)
Therefore, combining Eqs. (15) and (16), we obtain
(14) = I{A1}+ I{A2}
= I{C(x) 6= y}+ I{C(x) = y}×
I {∃x′ ∈ Nδ,T (x) s.t. C(x′) 6= C(x)} .
(17)
Similar to Eq. (14), we have
I {∃x′ ∈ Nδ,T (x) s.t. C(x′) 6= C(x)} = max
x′∈Nδ,T (x)
I{C(x′) 6= C(x)}. (18)
Combining Eqs. (17) and (18), we have
(17) = I{C(x) 6= y}+ I{C(x) = y} × max
x′∈Nδ,T (x)
I{C(x′) 6= C(x)}. (19)
According to the definitions of Radv , Rrob and Rstand,
(19) = Rstand(x) + (1−Rstand(x))Rrob(x). (20)
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Table 5: Comparison between SRT and RT under
spatial attacks on MNIST dataset.
Clean RandAdv GridAdv
Standard 97.19 71.00 40.49
RT (λ = 0.15) 98.47 92.88 72.85
SRT (λ = 0.15) 98.61 96.85 91.52
RT (λ = 0.20) 98.33 93.66 76.68
SRT (λ = 0.20) 98.64 97.02 92.12
RT (λ = 0.25) 98.29 93.91 78.00
SRT (λ = 0.25) 98.63 96.91 91.70
RT (λ = 0.30) 98.42 93.86 77.74
SRT (λ = 0.30) 98.62 97.08 91.44
Table 6: Comparison between SRT and RT un-
der pixel-wise attacks on MNIST dataset.
Clean FGSM PGD
Standard 99.02 93.80 86.12
RT (λ = 0.2) 99.06 97.18 95.84
SRT (λ = 0.2) 99.31 98.10 97.18
RT (λ = 0.4) 99.14 97.57 96.23
SRT (λ = 0.4) 99.40 98.28 97.55
RT (λ = 0.6) 99.06 97.78 96.92
SRT (λ = 0.6) 99.34 98.47 97.81
RT (λ = 0.8) 99.11 97.90 97.06
SRT (λ = 0.8) 99.35 98.53 97.86
Theorem 1. The relationship between the adversarial training and the robust training is as follows
min
w
Radv(D) ≤ min
w
{Rstand(D) +Rrob(D)}. (21)
Proof. Since Rstand(x), Rrob(x) ∈ [0, 1], according to Lemma 1, it is easy to obtain that
Radv(x) ≤ Rstand(x) +Rrob(x). (22)
By seeking the expectation on both sides of (22), we obtain
Radv(D) ≤ Rstand(D) +Rrob(D). (23)
Utilizing the fact that all three risks are non-negative, we further obtain
min
w
Radv(D) ≤ min
w
{Rstand(D) +Rrob(D)}. (24)
B Settings for Comparison between RT and SRT
Training Setup. In the spatial adversarial settings, we use a standard ResNet [39] with 4 residual
groups with filter size [16, 16, 32, 64] and 5 residual units each. We set the learning rate η2 = 0.1,
batch size m2 = 128, and run 80,000 iterations. In the pixel-wise experiments, we use the wide
residual network WRN-34-10 [40], and set the perturbation size 1 = 0.031, perturbation step size
α1 = 0.007, number of iterations K1 = 10 (for the inner maximization sub-problem), learning rate
η1 = 0.1, batch size m1 = 128, and run 100 epochs in the training dataset.
Data Preprocessing. We conduct standard data augmentation techniques for benign images. Specif-
ically, 4-pixel padding is used before performing random crops of size 32 × 32, followed by a
left-and-right random flipping with probability 0.5.
Attack Setup. We perform RandAdv and GridAdv attack [6] to evaluate the spatial adversarial
robustness. The spatial perturbation (i.e., rotation and translation) of RandAdv and GridAdv are
determined through random sampling and grid search, respectively. Specifically, the maximum
rotational perturbation is set as 30◦, and we consider translations of at most 3 pixels. For the GridAdv,
we consider 5 and 31 values equally spaced per direction for translation and rotation, respectively. For
the RandAdv, we perform a uniformly random perturbation from the attack spaced used in GridAdv.
These settings are based on those suggested in [6]. To evaluate the pixel-wise adversarial robustness,
we apply PGD-20 with step size 0.003 and FGSM under perturbation size 0.031, as suggested in [11].
C Comparison between SRT and RT on MNIST Dataset
Setup. We use a simple CNN with four convolutional layers followed by three fully-connected layers
[11] in both pixel-wise and spatial scenario. In spatial scenario, except for the model architecture,
the other settings are the same as those stated in Section B. In the pixel-wise experiments, we set
perturbation size as 0.1, perturbation step size as 0.01, number of iterations as 20, with learning rate
η3 = 0.01, batch size m3 = 128, and run 50 epochs in the training dataset. We apply PGD-40 with
step size 0.005 and FGSM under perturbation size 0.1, which are suggested in [11].
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Results. Similar to the results on the CIFAR-10 dataset, SRT is superior to RT under the same
conditions on the MNIST dataset. SRT is also much more robust than RT under stronger attack (PGD
and GridAdv), especially in the spatial scenario.
D Settings for Spatial Adversarial Defense
Setup. The training and the attack setup follow the same settings used in Section B-C. In SRT,
the we set λ = 0.2 on both CIFAR-10 and MNIST according to previous experiments, and the
hyper-parameters of baseline methods are set according to their paper.
E Settings for Pixel-wise Adversarial Defense
Training Setup. The model architectures are the same as those used in Section B-C. To ensure that
all methods have converged, we train 120 epochs in this experiment, and the initial learning rate is
changed to 0.05. The number of iterations and the perturbation size is modified to 40 and 0.3 on
MNIST respectively, as suggested in [11]. Other settings are the same as those used in Section B-C
above. In SRT, we set λ = 1 on both CIFAR-10 and MNIST, and the hyper-parameter of baseline
methods are set according to their paper. In particular, there are two default settings discussed
in TRADES, we choose the one with better performance (1/λ = 1 on MNIST and 1/λ = 6 on
CIFAR-10). Besides, we observe that when the regularization weight β is set to 6, as suggested in the
paper, the UAT is hard to learn on the CIFAR-10 dataset. As such, we modify the hyper-parameter β
to 1 on the CIFAR-10 dataset according to cross-validation.
Robustness Evaluation Setup. We apply FGSM, PGD, momentum iterative attack (MI-FGSM)
[43] under `∞ norm in the evaluation, since these methods are similar to the one (PGD) used in
solving the inner-maximization in SRT. We also apply some other attack methods, including jacobian
saliency map attack (JSMA) [28], Carlini & Wagner attack (C&W) [44], point-wise attack [45], and
decoupled direction and norm attack (DDNA) [46] for the evaluation. All attacks are implemented
based on Advertorch [48] and Foolbox [49]. On the CIFAR-10 dataset, we set perturbation size
 = 0.031 for FGSM, PGD and MI-FGSM, the step size α = 0.007, and the iteration step is set to 10.
On the MNIST dataset, we apply PGD-40 and MI-FGSM-40 with step size 0.01 and FGSM under
perturbation size 0.3.
F Settings for Compound Adversarial Attack and Defense
Attack Setup. There are mainly two different ways to construct a compound attack based on
combining different types of attacks. One way is to choose the best attack within many differ-
ent types of attacks, and the other is to conduct multiple attacks in sequence. The first way is
discussed in [21], and we discuss the second way in this paper. Let  = (1, 2, 3) indicates
the user-defined maximum perturbation size, where 1, 2, 3 is the maximum rotation, maximum
translation, and maximum pixel-wise perturbation respectively. We evaluate two types of com-
pound adversarial attacks, including 1) combining GridAdv on the top of PGD (PGD+): T1(x) =
A(θ) ·(x+ argmaxr∈B∞() L(f(x+ r), y))+B and dist1(T1(x),x) = (θ, ‖B‖∞,∞) ≤ (1, 2),
where A(θ) = [cos θ,− sin θ; sin θ, cos θ] and B∞() = {x|‖x‖∞ ≤ }; and 2) combining PGD on
the top of GridAdv (GridAdv+): T2(x; r) = A∗x + B∗ + r and dist2(T2(x),x) = ‖r‖∞ ≤ 3,
where
(A∗, B∗) = arg max
(A(θ),B):θ≤1,‖B‖∞,∞≤2
L(A(θ)x+B, y).
Defense Setup. We generate the perturbed samples needed for compound adversarial defense by
first performing a pixel-wise attack and then a spatial attack. Specifically, we provide two different
compound defenses, including 1) combining Worst-of-k on the top of AT (AT+), and 2) combining
spatial SRT on the top of pixel-wise SRT (SRT+).
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Table 7: The computational complexity of all methods discussed in this paper. Note that the hyper-
parameter N,M, Ii, and Io may not necessary to be the same across different methods.
Standard Training Worst-of-k, KLR, AT, TRADES UAT, RST, SRT
O (N · Io) O (N · Ii · Io) O ((N +M) · Ii · Io)
G Analysis of Computational Complexity
In this section, we discuss the computational complexity of SRT and all baseline methods.
All baseline defenses are ‘AT-type’, i.e., under the ‘min-max’ framework, and their inner-
maximization is solved by PGD. Suppose the number of iterations used in the inner-maximization
and the outer-minimization are Ii and Io, respectively. Let N , M indicate the number of labeled
samples and unlabeled samples, respectively. In general, the computational complexity of all methods
is O ((N +M) · Ii · Io), while M = 0 for supervised methods and Ii = 1 for the standard training.
In summary, the computational complexity of all methods are shown in Table 7.
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(a) spatial scenario (b) pixel-wise scenario
Figure 4: The decision surfaces of SRT-based model and those of the standard training model on the
CIFAR-10 dataset. In the 3D decision surfaces, the X and Y axis represent two different perturbation
directions and its value indicates the perturbation size, while the Z-axis indicates the decision value.
If and only if the decision value is positive, the prediction is correct. In those figures, the red area
indicates the correctly classified region, while the blue area is the misclassified region.
(a) spatial scenario (b) pixel-wise scenario
Figure 5: The loss surfaces of SRT-based model and those of the standard training model on the
MNIST dataset. In the 3D loss surface, the X and Y axis represent two different perturbation
directions and its value indicates the perturbation size, while the Z-axis indicates the loss.
(a) spatial scenario (b) pixel-wise scenario
Figure 6: The loss surfaces of SRT-based model and those of the standard training model on the
CIFAR-10 dataset.
H Additional Decision and Loss Surfaces
In this section, we present the visualization of decision surface on CIFAR-10 in Figure 4, and the
visualizations of loss surfaces on both MNIST [36] and CIFAR-10 [35] database in Figures 5-6.
As shown in Figure 4, the geometric properties of the decision surface on the CIFAR-10 dataset
are very similar to those on MNIST. Specifically, compared with SRT, the decision surfaces of the
standard training model have sharper peaks and larger slopes, which explains that its prediction is
vulnerable to small perturbation. In contrast, the surfaces of SRT are flat and located on a plateau
with positive decision value around the benign sample.
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Figure 7: The comparison between different types of compound adversarial defenses. The maximum
perturbation size is the same as the one used in previous experiments. Perturbation fraction represents
the ratio of the current perturbation size to the previous maximum perturbation size. First row:
Results on CIFAR-10 dataset. Second row: Results on MNIST dataset.
Moreover, as shown in Figures 5-6, the loss surfaces between SRT and those of the model with
standard training also have different properties. Specifically, the loss surfaces of the standard training
model have much higher peak and larger slopes, compared with the surfaces of SRT. Although the
loss value is not directly related to the correctness of prediction compared with the decision value,
the aforementioned difference still verifies the effectiveness of SRT.
I Different Types of Compound Defenses
In this section, we compare two different types of the compound adversarial defense, including SRT+
and AT+ proposed in this paper, and those proposed in [21], dubbed AT (average) and AT (max). AT
(average) and AT (max) respectively minimize the average error rate across perturbation types, or the
error rate against an adversary that picks the worst perturbation type for each input. Specifically, for
each training sample in the AT (average) and the AT (max), these methods build adversarial examples
for all perturbation types and then train either on all examples or only the worst example. We conduct
compound adversarial attacks, including GridAdv+ and PGD+, to evaluate the adversarial robustness
of the compound adversarial defense methods. All training and evaluation settings are the same as
those demonstrated in Section 4.4 of the main manuscript.
As shown in Figure 7, compared with the compound strategies proposed in [21], our methods reach
better adversarial robustness under compound adversarial attacks. Moreover, in the case of compound
defense, our method (SRT+) is also better than all other methods. Especially on the MNIST dataset,
compared to the second best method, the AT+, our method achieves an increase of more than 7% in
adversarial accuracy under PGD+ attack. This improvement is even more significant under GridAdv+
attack, which is more than 10%.
J Fast Semi-supervised Robust Training
Adversarial training based defenses (e.g., AT and TRADES) are often much more time-consuming
than standard training. For example, the cost of AT trained in the ImageNet dataset is more than 4,500
GPU hours for ResNet-101, as reported in [38]. Such a high cost hinders the use of those methods,
especially semi-supervised based methods, which require a large amount of training data. To alleviate
this problem, we propose an accelerated version of SRT (dubbed fast SRT) in this section.
In fast SRT, we adopt two acceleration techniques introduced in [50], including cyclic learning rate
and FGSM-based inner-maximization solver. The cyclic schedule can drastically reduce the number
of epochs required for training deep networks [51], and the FGSM-based solver drastically reduce
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(a) spatial scenario (b) pixel-wise scenario
Figure 8: Cyclic learning rates used for fast SRT.
Algorithm 1 PGD-based inner-maximization solver with K-steps, given benign example x, loss
function L and step size α, maximum perturbation size  for generating adversarial example x′.
1: x′ ← x // or initialize with small random Gaussian perturbation
2: for i = 1 · · ·K do
3: x′ ← x′ + α∇xL
4: x′ ← max (min (x′,x+ ),x− )
5: end for
6: x′ ← max (min (x′,1),0)
Algorithm 2 FGSM-based inner-maximization solver, given benign example x, loss function L and
step size α, maximum perturbation size  for generating adversarial example x′.
1: x′ ← x + Uniform(−, ) // initialize with random uniform perturbation
2: x′ ← x′ + α∇xL
3: x′ ← max (min (x′,x+ ),x− )
4: x′ ← max (min (x′,1),0)
Table 8: Comparison among different models under spatial attacks.
Clean GridAdv GridAdv.T GridAdv.R Time (mins)
Worst-of-k 82.02 54.80 69.45 68.22 1,654
KLR 85.40 56.28 72.71 71.04 1,697
SRT 88.87 64.83 78.47 77.24 1,573
fast SRT 89.21 64.81 78.57 77.24 855
Table 9: Comparison among different models under pixel-wise attacks.
Clean FGSM PGD MI-FGSM JSMA C&W DDNA Time (mins)
AT 77.17 50.35 37.37 36.97 10.80 33.42 20.87 895
TRADES 76.72 51.98 40.20 39.79 11.90 36.09 22.37 10,94
SRT 78.46 59.34 48.66 48.24 16.99 43.33 27.71 2,916
fast SRT 82.27 58.27 44.93 44.45 12.27 40.85 26.12 257
the iterations for generating adversarial examples (roughly K-times faster than the PGD-based solver
with K-steps). The FGSM-based inner-maximization solver is shown in Algorithm 2.
Settings. We evaluate the performance of fast SRT on CIFAR-10 dataset. Specifically, the two
aforementioned techniques are both involved in the pixel-wise fast SRT, while only cyclic learning
rate is adopted in the spatial fast SRT (since its inner-maximization solver is far different from the
PGD-based one used in pixel-wise fast SRT). The step size α in FGSM-based solver is set to 1.25
as suggested in [50]. We train fast SRT 50 epochs in pixel-wise scenario and 45,000 iterations in
spatial scenario, and the specific learning rate schedule is shown in Figure 8. All defense experiments
are conducted on one single GeForce GTX 1080 GPU. Other settings are the same as those used in
Section 4.2-4.3 in the main manuscript.
18
(a) spatial scenario (b) pixel-wise scenario
Figure 9: The effect of maximum learning rate and total training time on adversarial robustness.
Specifically, we use GridAdv and PGD to evaluate the adversarial robustness in the spatial and
pixel-wise scenarios, respectively. The specific attack settings are the same as those used in Section
4.2-4.3 in the main manuscript.
Results. As shown in Table 8-9, fast SRT is significantly faster than the standard SRT. Especially in
the pixel-wise scenario, Fast SRT is ten times faster than the standard version. Although fast SRT has
a certain performance degradation compared to SRT especially when FGSM-based solver is used, the
performance of fast SRT is still significantly better than supervised defenses (e.g., TRADES, KLR).
In other words, fast SRT decreases the computational cost while preserves efficiency.
There are two key hyper-parameters in the fast SRT, including maximum learning rate (dubbed
LR-max) and total training time (epochs or iterations). We further visualize their effect on adversarial
robustness. As shown in Figure 9, the adversarial robustness increase with the increase of the total
training time regardless of the value of LR-max in both spatial and pixel-wise scenarios. Besides,
the adversarial accuracy still has an upward trend at the end of the curve, which implies that the
robustness can be further improved if additional iterations/epochs are utilized, which brings additional
computational costs.
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